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The collective securitization of cyberspace in the European Union 
 
 
 
 
The European Union (EU) along with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) were forced 
to radically rethink their common approach to network protection and information security in 
the aftermath of Russian-sourced, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on Estonian 
public and private institutions and infrastructure in April-May 2007.  Since then, many high-
profile cases of cybersecurity breaches and attacks have occurred against EU bodies including 
against the European Commission, the European Parliament (EP) and the European External 
Action Service (EEAS). There has also been a steady increase in everyday cyber breaches and 
greater availability of cyber-disruptive tools online; both problems present a challenge to the 
growth of the European digital economy (ENISA 2016). It is difficult to find an area of life where 
Information Communications Technologies (ICTs) are not important, from e-health to social 
networks to supply chains, cloud computing, The Internet of Things (IoT) and ‘smart’ systems. 
The issue of securing cyberspace has thus risen up the EU’s political agenda and is perceived as 
an increasing threat to the EU and to the citizens, governments and businesses of its Member 
States.  
The secure development and use of ICTs is a critical pillar of the EU’s Digital Single 
Market Strategy (European Commission 2015a) and agreed upon initiatives, such as the 
contractual Public Private Partnership (cPPP) (European Commission 2016a), have been geared 
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toward stimulating the innovation and competitiveness of Europe’s cybersecurity industry.1 The 
Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union (CSSEU) (European Commission and High 
Representative 2013) identifies five priority areas of action aimed at achieving coherent and 
effective policies that address threats arising from the increased use of ICTs and the Internet. At 
the core of this project is the Networks and Information Systems (NIS) Directive. Adopted by 
the European Parliament in July 2016 and building upon the Directive on Attacks against 
Information Systems (European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2013), this is the 
first piece of European legislation that seeks to ensure a minimal institutional capability for 
reporting cyber incidents across Member States and so manage the risks associated with 
cyberattacks.2  
              Alongside the CSSEU, the European Agenda on Security (European Commission 2015b) 
and the Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats (European Commission and European 
External Action Service, 2016) provide further strategic guidance on cybersecurity and 
cybercrime. Cyber is also recognised as a priority area in the EU’s Communication Launching the 
European Defence Fund (European Commission 2017a: 3) and is included in the European 
Commission Communication on achieving an effective and genuine Security Union (European 
Commission, 2016c). The EU in June 2017, adopted a framework for a joint EU diplomatic 
response to cyber activities and earlier EU internal security documents and Justice and Home 
Affairs programmes have referenced the challenges associated with cybersecurity (see Council 
of the European Union 2010a, 2010b). Perhaps most authoritatively, the EU Global Strategy 
(Council of the European Union 2016, p.22) points to the importance of fostering a ‘common 
cyber security culture’ in order to raise preparedness for cyber disruptions and attacks.  
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What we have seen emerging in the EU is a system of cybersecurity governance across 
three distinct, but inter-related mandates: Freedom, Justice and Security (AFSJ), the Internal 
Market, and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). These exist within multiple 
spaces – national, regional and global (Christou 2016). Governance in relation to cyberspace 
reflects the fact disruption has been framed as a collective threat which, if not addressed 
effectively through EU rules, norms and regulations will affect the economic and social 
development of the EU and its Member States. There is thus a clearly articulated sense of 
‘vulnerab[ility] to cyber incidents’ (European Commission 2016b); a view that ‘cybercrime is an 
attack on basic societal values and citizens’ security’ in the EU (Malmström 2012); and that ‘the 
continuously evolving and deepening threat landscape calls for more action to withstand and 
deter attacks in the future’ (European Commission 2017b). In short, according to the EU’s 
‘Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox’ cyber threats present possible harm to the EU’s ‘political, security 
and economic interests’ (Council of the European Union 2017).  
The phraseology of this discourse is worthy of note insofar as it references risk as well as 
threat (see also Fahey 2014). For the Commission (European Commission 2017b, p.2) there is a 
‘risk of politically motivated attacks on civilian targets, and of shortcomings in military cyber 
defence’, and an expectation that unless the EU ‘substantially improve[s its] cybersecurity the 
risk will increase in line with digital transformation.’ Such framing, has implications for policy 
and practice. In the case of cybersecurity at the EU level, it can be argued that collective 
securitization based on a shared understanding of the cybersecurity risk is evolving and visible 
through the politics of routine rather than through any exceptional measures taken outside 
‘normal politics.’  That is, with cybersecurity, measures taken by the EU have in the main been 
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reflective of its modus operandi, not in exception to it. To extend this further, the inter-
changeability of risk and threat in the cyber-security discourse suggests the latter is not a 
distinct category for which exceptional measures are needed. The cyber-security response, in 
other words, has been subject to securitisation but that response has obtained a quality of 
normalcy within the EU.  
By way of illustration, a body of EU Regulations, Directives and law has grown relating to 
cybersecurity (Wessel 2015) and new, more effective governance procedures and agencies 
have been constituted to address the cross-border, global nature of the cybersecurity problem. 
This includes the investigation of cybercriminal activity through the European Cybercrime 
Centre (EC3) and the Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce (J-CAT) (Christou 2018), information 
sharing through Sectoral Information Sharing and Analysis Centres, and the co-funding of 
public-private initiatives such as the Online Fraud Cyber Centre and Experts Network. Whilst EU 
Member State governments still conceive of cybersecurity as a private good to be dealt with 
through national strategies, they have also recognised that its transnational nature, imbues 
upon it the status of a collective public good.  The central consequence is that cybersecurity 
threats and risks are shared with others in the EU, with security discourse, practice and policy 
subsequently evolving and augmenting itself within the EU’s rules, norms and procedures to be 
implemented internally, and projected externally, through the EU’s actorness.  
It is a central premise of collective securitization (*** and *** this issue), that a logic of 
securitization is evident when a securitizing actor justifies its actions, and ultimately policy and 
practice, by reference to an identified threat. In this sense, we can argue that the EU is a 
securitizing actor in the cybersecurity domain, albeit across a complex ecosystem of 
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differentiated mandates.  Not only this, but we can identify the effects and consequences of 
collective securitization in relation to governance; that is, increased patterned, stakeholder and 
regulatory interactions but also in relation to the collective EU effort (or strategy) to address 
cybersecurity. 
This article analyses how the collective securitization of cybersecurity has evolved in 
terms of the model outlined by *** and *** (this issue). That model’s stages are analytically 
separate but when applied to cybersecurity they are overlapping, messy and interconnected, 
making systematic presentation somewhat difficult. To add to the difficulty, EU policy itself is 
fragmented and differentiated temporally across three areas - cybercrime, network and 
information security, and cyber defence – each underpinned by differing institutional 
mandates, processes and logics. This makes the identification of the stages of collective 
securitization more complex in relation to the securitizing actor/audience relationship and in 
terms of the analysis of national transposition (routinization) in areas where important, newly 
adopted Directives (e.g. the NIS Directive) have, at the time of writing (April 2018), not been 
implemented by Member States.  That said, the framing article points to collective 
securitization through aggregation and the articulation of a common EU security discourse 
despite the EU’s many component parts. Such a state of affairs (the EU as actor) can certainly 
be identified in the case of cybersecurity given the various practices and policies that have 
sought to address the cybersecurity issue as one that needs to be resolved on an EU wide basis 
(see also Carrapico and Barrinha 2017).  
In order to provide deeper insight in to the collective securitization of EU cybersecurity 
this article will limit its analysis to two areas - cybercrime and network and information security 
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(NIS) or critical information infrastructure protection. Cyber defence might seem an obvious 
focus given that the ‘use of cyberspace as a domain of warfare, either solely or as part of a 
hybrid approach, is now widely acknowledged’ (European Commission 2017b, p.2). The EU 
response here is, however, still under-developed. Cybercrime and NIS are more established and 
are areas of shared competence where the EU institutions and Member States’ actions have 
increasingly been constructed through a communitarizing process (notwithstanding the 
tenacity of Member State perspectives in AFSJ). This is pertinent to the collective securitization 
model and the assumption that a speech act, following a precipitating event or sequence of 
events and trends, involves statements of authoritative EU actors and endorsement by an 
empowering audience.  
Reflecting a central premise of the collective securitization model, it is argued in this 
article that both specific events and longer-term trends have galvanised and reinforced the EU 
discourse of increasing threat and risk around cybersecurity, at different points in time.  Thus, 
for example, whilst the Estonian attacks in 2007 certainly caused the EU to reflect with some 
urgency on the increasing threat and review its approach, new policy initiatives evolved 
incrementally thereafter, rather than being the product of any emergency action outside the 
EU’s normal politics. Moreover, it is clear in the case of cybersecurity, that discourses of threat 
and risk have continued beyond policy initiation, and that this discourse has very much run in 
parallel with further action and initiatives. Finally, this article demonstrates how collective 
securitization and legislation in certain key areas related to cybersecurity can also be subject to 
EU institutional desecuritization moves, leading to national policy differentiation following a 
precipitating event (e.g. the Edward Snowden affair, which revealed mass surveillance policies).      
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This article is divided into the following sections. The first provides an overview of how 
the EU security discourse on cybersecurity has evolved in relation to NIS and cybercrime, and 
how this has shaped common understandings and governance practices. It will show how a 
series of events has resulted in securitizing moves, audience response and policy actions that 
are indicative of a process of collective securitization. In so doing, it will identify instances of 
recursive interaction between EU Member States and EU institutions that creates a 
securitization narrative in collective form, and point out what this implies for cybersecurity 
governance and practice. The second section takes a closer look at recursive interaction and 
emerging policy and practices specifically around the CSSEU – again, with a focus on NIS and 
cybercrime. The Conclusion summarises the main implications for the EU as a cybersecurity 
actor relating to the processes of collective securitization and security governance.    
 
Shaping and transforming the status quo narrative?  
No single precipitating event has triggered the EU’s policy on cybersecurity; it has, however, 
evolved in response to identifiable external drivers. The initial EU discourse was underpinned 
by an economic logic related to the progression of the Single Market. Thus within the 
Bangemann report (1994) information and computer security was seen as essential to the 
economic development of the EU and completion of the Single Market (in fact, a concern with 
the security of computer and information networks in Europe can be traced back still further  to 
the Tengelin Report of 1980). This economic logic has given rise to a number of initiatives 
relating to cybercrime and the protection of critical national infrastructure.  
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Network and information security.  
The e-Europe initiative (eEurope 1999) and the Communication on Network and Information 
Security: Proposal for a European Policy Approach, (European Commission, 2001a) highlighted 
the importance of information infrastructure protection for the EU, with the latter also 
providing recommendations on how to enhance security within the technical, legal and policy 
domains. Similarly, the Commission communication Creating a Safer Information Society by 
Improving the Security of Infrastructures and Combating Computer-Related Crime proposed a 
series of measures to address criminal activities both domestically and transnationally, whilst 
also stressing the need to preserve the balance between security and respect for the 
fundamental rights of individuals (European Commission 2001b: p.2).  
Such Communications, alongside an evaluation of the e-Europe Initiative in 2003, were 
indicative of a still emergent understanding of cyber security challenges. Hence, there was no 
mention of computer-related crime or any cyber-related threat in the 2003 European Security 
Strategy (Council of the European Union 2003). The EU response at this point was, in fact, 
largely derivative. EU cyber-security discourse in the early 2000s was influenced by frameworks 
developed by other countries (the US most notably), as well as international and regional 
organisations such as the G8 (see its Action Plan on computer-related crime, 1997) and the 
Council of Europe (Convention on Cyber Crime, 2001) (Deflem and Shutt 2006). That said, the 
EU response did give rise to incipient modes of EU security governance aimed at combating 
computer crime, and ensuring the reliability and security of networks and information systems. 
This, in turn, is evidence of the stakeholder interaction noted by *** and *** (this issue). 
Initiatives driven by EU institutions emphasised the need for cooperation between public and 
Formatted: Not Highlight
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private stakeholders in response to Member State concerns relating to illegal and harmful 
content on the Internet and increasing levels of high-tech criminal activity (Council of the 
European Union, 1997).  
The terrorist threats that emerged in the early and mid-2000s facilitated a shift in the 
perceived vulnerability of information security and network systems within Europe (Carrapico 
and Barrinha 2017: 13). It was at this time that the economic logic was supplemented by an 
explicit security logic in the EU’s approach to information and network security and computer 
crime. This, inevitably, had implications for governance practice.  In particular, there was a step-
change away from a soft law approach (Fahey 2014: 49-51) towards more patterned and 
regulatory interaction that saw the formulation of legally- binding instruments for addressing 
attacks on information systems.  
Thus, the EU’s i2010 initiative (European Commission 2005) emphasised the importance 
of the security of the Single European Information Space and the ‘reliability and security of 
networks and information systems.’ The Council Framework Decision on Attacks against 
Information Systems, meanwhile, noted:  
 
There is evidence of attacks against information systems, in particular as a result of 
the threat from organised crime, and increasing concern at the potential of terrorist 
attacks against information systems which form part of the critical infrastructure of 
the Member States. This constitutes a threat to the achievement of a safer 
information society and an area of freedom, security and justice, and therefore 
requires a response at the level of the European Union (Council of the European 
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Union 2005). 
 
Similar concerns were expressed on issues of sexual exploitation of children and child 
pornography giving rise to a 2004 Council Framework Decision (Council of the European Union 
2004). That decision stipulated only minimal requirements in terms of approximation of 
legislation across EU Member States, and subsequently led to problems in prosecuting 
offenders within and between national borders (Fahey 2014). The legal logic behind these 
framework decisions, however, was to make coordination of efforts easier between the 
relevant public authorities (to improve horizontal stakeholder interaction) even if in practice 
there remained constraints given that there was no real collective culture of cybersecurity.  
The European Commission’s communication A Strategy for a Secure Information Society 
(European Commission 2006) and the subsequent, broader Digital Agenda for Europe initiative 
(European Commission 2010) took coordination further. The former aimed to ‘develop a 
dynamic, global strategy in Europe, based on a culture of security […] founded on dialogue, 
partnership and empowerment’ (European Commission 2006: 3). The Commission recognised 
that it had to move beyond a focus simply on cybercrime toward network and information 
security measures and a regulatory framework for electronic communications that addressed 
issues of privacy and data protection. This meant a multi-stakeholder approach and the 
promotion of a collective security culture that was more likely to deal not just with the 
symptoms, but also with the underlying causes of cybercrime, at both individual and 
institutional levels. While cybersecurity as such had not entered the EU’s lexicon at this point – 
perceptions of increased threats to information and network security had resulted in speech 
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acts and practice that sought to move beyond the status quo.      
This shift by the Commission (2006: 6-9) had already been flagged by the creation of the 
European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) in 2004. ENISA would play a key 
role in identifying best practice, improving awareness, and cultivating partnerships among all 
stakeholders. It was also tasked in its original mandate (of 2005) with supporting national 
Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), for which it established a CERT programme and 
Working Group on CERT Co-operation and Support. One could argue that ENISA was the 
outcome of an increased awareness of the vulnerability of communication networks and 
information systems, and the importance of such systems to the economic and societal 
development of the EU (European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2004). ENISA, 
in fact, was created – and co-constituted by the Council and EP – because of a growing number 
of security breaches that had generated substantive damage financially and had undermined 
confidence, thereby adversely affecting the EU’s plans to develop e-commerce. ENISA’s raison 
d’etre was expressed in the language of risk – ‘[t]o understand better the challenges in the 
network and information security field, there is a need for the Agency to analyse current and 
emerging risks’ (European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2004: 2).  A 
perception of increased risk thus induced a securitizing move by authoritative EU institutional 
actors that was accepted by the empowering audience (the Member States).  ENISA was 
granted a second, enhanced, mandate in 2010, and in a subsequent 2017 European 
Commission proposal for a new Regulation for an EU Cybersecurity Agency (European 
Commission 2017c: 2) it was suggested ENISA be given ‘a more operational and central role in 
achieving cybersecurity resilience’ given ‘the prospect of large scale incidents and a possible 
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Pan-European cybersecurity crisis.’ ENISA has had a substantive impact on security governance; 
for example, in facilitating improved stakeholder interaction (private-private, public-private) 
and learning and  formulatinge  regulatory compliance mechanisms.     
ENISA was only one prong of the EU’s emerging approach to critical infrastructure 
protection. The 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia acted as a trigger for a securitizing move by the 
European Commission and subsequent agreement and reinforcement by EU Member States. In 
response to the attacks, the then EU Information Society and Media Commissioner, Viviane 
Reding (cited in Reuters 2007), asserted that ‘[w]e have to wake up our governments […] if 
people do not understand the urgency now, they never will.’. Building on the Council 
Framework Decision of 2005, the Commission then took the lead (with the caveat that the 
Member States had provided them with the authority and initiative to do so) in producing a 
Communication on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) (European Commission 
2009), which proposed an action plan to address key challenges. Those proposals sat in parallel 
to and under the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPICP), and 
proposals in 2009 to revise the EU’s Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications 
(European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2009). That revision included 
legislation that made mandatory (Art.13a) the reporting of any network and information 
systems security breaches to the national regulatory authority (NRA). This step-change was a 
significant (framing) move away from the voluntary approach (which had characterised the 
2006 Communication, for example), with ENISA tasked to support Member States in 
implementing Article 13a through the Technical Guidelines on Incident Reporting, which 
created a standard incident reporting methodology and mechanism (ENISA 2013).  
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Important in the context of the collective securitization model and increased patterned 
and stakeholder interaction are the proposed pillars of action in the CIIP: Preparedness and 
Prevention, Detection and Response, Mitigation and Recovery, International Cooperation, and 
Criteria for ICT. These pillars have embraced practices relating to the establishment of 
minimum national level capabilities for CERTs, a European public-private partnership for 
resilience and a European forum for Member States to share good practice, as well as the 
establishment of an early warning information sharing and alert system, the development of 
national contingency plans, and pan-European cyber exercises. Whilst we could frame such 
proposals as securitizing moves on the part of authoritative EU institutional actors, the extent 
to which they have resulted in collective securitization in practice is open to debate given that 
not all Member States have participated equally or indeed implemented symmetrically the 
proposed pillars of action. Thus, we are missing the co-constitution from the audience in such a 
move that would routinize practice or indicate policy implementation in this area across all EU 
Member States. So at best, we can talk of imperfect collective securitization in this instance.  
That said, the Member States have shown a willingness to concede an informational if 
not operational role to an EU agency (principally ENISA) and increased stakeholder interaction 
has occurred given that certain proposals have been co-constituted by the Commission, ENISA 
and the Member States. And the Member States in at least one regard - that of cyber-security 
exercises – have submitted to the coordination of ENISA in what has now become a routine 
matter. This vertical interaction has been complemented by horizontal initiatives (see *** and 
*** this issue for this distinction). The 2011 European Principles and Guidelines for Internet 
Resilience and Stability, was the direct result of horizontal interaction in the European Forum of 
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Member States (2011) – an EU level body for Member State representatives to share best 
practice and encourage discussion and cooperation relating to critical information 
infrastructure security. It set out the principles and norms that would underpin EU policy on 
internet security and stability.  This document, in turn, fed in to the CSSEU (see above) that sets 
out the position of the EU as an actor in Internet security and stability, and in relation to 
cybersecurity governance more broadly.     
In summary, what we have seen in relation to the EU’s approach to CIIP is securitization 
moves initiated by authoritative EU institutional actors such as the EP, the Council and the 
Commission following certain specific events and increasing perceptions of threat, risk and 
vulnerability. The audience (the Member States) has been largely in agreement on broad 
principles but not always in relation to the specific mechanisms of regulatory security 
governance (policy output and practice) that might follow.   
 
Cybercrime.   
In cybercrime, it has been trends rather than any major precipitating external event that has 
driven EU initiatives3 (Fahey 2014; Wessel 2015). The first such trend has been the shift in 
cybercrime away from simple disruption toward profit seeking. This has meant a   
proliferation of malware vehicles including spam, spyware and phishing, and an increasing 
exploitation of compromised servers and computers for their distribution (European 
Commission 2006: 4). Second, has been technological development. Mobile telephony (mobile 
based network services) and ‘ambient intelligence’ (intelligent devices supported by computer 
and network technology) have presented challenges to the integrity and security of the 
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Internet, and provided additional platforms for attack by cybercriminals.  
 The EU was not an institutional first mover in response. The 2001 Framework Decision 
on Combating Fraud and Counterfeiting and the ePrivacy Directive of 2002 were measures 
aimed at ensuring the security of electronic communications services and combating fraudulent 
behaviour. Neither measure focussed on cyber issues to the extent of the European Convention 
on Cybercrime adopted by the Council of Europe in 2001. That Convention appears, however, 
to have prompted EU action. In 2005, the EU adopted the Framework Decision on Attacks 
against Information Systems (Council of the European Union 2005) followed shortly after by the 
European Commission’s Communication Towards a General Policy on the Fight against 
Cybercrime (European Commission 2007). The latter was crucial in the emergence of new 
practices and agencies at the EU level. It highlighted ‘[a] growing vulnerability to cybercrime 
risks for society, business and citizens’ and ‘the need for urgent action to improve European 
coordination and cooperation between high-tech crime units in Member States and with the 
private sector.’ 
The approach advocated by the Commission has meant explicit movement towards a 
type of security governance that entails both non-legal stakeholder interaction (supporting 
partnership, coordination) and regulatory interaction (legislation to add legal clarity and 
improve cooperation between law enforcement agencies). This approach, significantly, has had 
buy-in from the Member States evident in the shaping influence of the EU Internal Security 
Strategy (ISS) of 2010 and the Stockholm Programme (2010 – 2014) that articulated EU 
priorities for developing the Area of Justice, Freedom and Security.  
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 Importantly, with regard to the collective securitization model, these initiatives indicate 
that the Member States had progressed beyond a ‘thin’ version to imbue the EU with 
autonomy and agency. The ISS, for instance, recognised ‘that many security challenges 
(cybercrime, terrorism, illegal immigration and organised crime) are cross-border and cross-
sectoral in nature’, and that ‘no single EU country is able to respond effectively to these threats 
on its own.’ The ISS is thus the EU’s ‘joint agenda to use all the resources and expertise 
available to jointly tackle these challenges’ (EUR-Lex n.d). Such a threat narrative was also 
reinforced by the European Commission. Its Action Plan for the ISS noted that, ‘[the] the 
incidence of attacks against information systems has increased significantly in recent years.  
Estonia in 2007 and Lithuania in 2008 were subject to large-scale cyber-attack.  The botnet 
'Conficker' […] has since November 2008 spread to affect millions of computers worldwide, 
including, in the EU, France, the UK and Germany. Every individual and business using the 
Internet is potentially vulnerable to cybercrimes’ (European Commission 2010).  
Cybercrime remains a top priority for the EU. According to the European 
Commission (2012a: 3), it is a major spur towards ‘efforts to develop an overarching EU strategy 
to strengthen cyber-security.’ It is also one of the ten ‘most pressing criminal threats’ listed in 
the 2018 – 2021 EU policy cycle for organised and serious international crime (Europol n.d).  It 
might be argued that the resultant security governance (the transposition, execution and 
routinization of policy down to the Member States) has only been asymmetric at best – limited 
by ‘jurisdictional boundaries, insufficient intelligence-sharing capabilities, technical difficulties 
in tracing the origins of cybercrime perpetrators, disparate investigative and forensic capacities, 
scarcity of trained staff, and inconsistent cooperation with other stakeholders responsible for 
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cyber-security’ (European Commission 2012a: 3; see also European Commission 2017d). That 
said, stakeholder interaction – the deferral to EU institutional prerogatives on cybercrime – has 
nonetheless occurred. The European Commission has sought to improve cooperation and 
coordination among national law enforcement agencies, and has promoted legal and political 
cooperation with third countries, with a particular emphasis on cybercrime training for law 
enforcement and judicial authorities.  
Furthermore, the public-private aspect of the Commission’s cybercrime policy has 
expanded. This has included efforts to combat child pornography, where effective collaboration 
between credit card companies and law enforcement agencies has assisted police in tracking 
down users of illegal on-line material. This area has also, however, illustrated a significant 
limitation on EU action. There is no legal obligation for private companies (i.e. banks and other 
issuers of credit cards) to share information on cybercrime with public authorities.  Secrecy 
rather than open sharing of information was favoured to avoid threatening the reputation and 
profits of firms. In this sense, it was the private sector as co-enforcers of agreed practice4 – 
despite co-constitution at the EU level of measures to facilitate the combat of cybercrime – that 
has hindered the realisation of effective outcomes.  
The issue of information sharing also has broader ramifications. The EU’s agreed rules 
on data protection, privacy and retention are crucial for the purposes of prosecuting and 
convicting cyber criminals. The EU has taken forward measures related to operational aspects 
of cybercrime by implementing the Data Retention Directive (European Parliament and Council 
of the European Union 2006). As a law enforcement measure aimed at accessing data, this 
initiative ran up against other measures, notably the Data Protection Directive (European 
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Parliament and Council of the European Union, 1995) geared toward digital rights and the 
avoidance of data misuse and surveillance.  With the Edward Snowden revelations, data 
protection has become far more significant and, in effect, the EU has become an agent of 
desecuritizsation pushing for stronger EU legislation related to data protection and privacy 
rather than measures to increase intrusion into the private digital space. Even prior to this 
watershed, the EU had adopted the E-Privacy Directive in 2002 (see above) and an amended 
version in 2009 with the aim of ensuring the confidentiality of communications and of 
preventing unauthorised access to customer data. Snowden, however, created a new 
momentum resulting in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (European Parliament 
and Council of the European Union 2016), which came into effect in May 2018.  A new 
Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications has also been proposed geared toward 
ensuring ‘the […] confidentiality of communications and the protection of personal data in the 
electronic communications sector’ (European Commission 2017e, p.1).  
Complementing these desecuritizzing moves, in April 2014 the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) annulled the Data Retention Directive on the grounds that it represented an infringement 
of the individual’s right to privacy. Such a move, however, has caused considerable tension with 
certain Member States (the UK, Germany and Portugal) who have mandated data retention. 
Indeed, in this context the UK’s 2016 Investigatory Powers Act, which provides UK security 
services and police with powers to hack into computers and phones to collect communications 
data in bulk, has been ruled illegal by the ECJ (Agerholm 2016).   
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The EU cybersecurity strategy: collective securitization and accelerating security governance? 
 
This section picks out one emblematic initiative – the CSSEU - to illustrate further the 
significance of the securitizsation of cyber by the EU.  The CSSEU emerged out of A Proposal on 
a European Strategy for Internet Security produced by the Directorate-General for 
Communications Networks, Content and Technology (DG CONNECT).  The underlying rationale 
for that proposal was to deal with a changing threat landscape: 
not only have the Internet and digital technologies become even more central to our 
economies and societies, but their vulnerability has increased and the number and 
seriousness of attacks has magnified (attacks on Estonia, on the French Finance 
Ministry prior to the G20 summit, on the EU Emissions Trading System and most 
recently on the European External Action Service and the Commission are cases in 
point) (European Commission 2011: 2).   
 
The CSSEU itself, meanwhile, indicated a move ‘[t]o address cybersecurity in a 
comprehensive fashion.’ That document acknowledged that ‘the complexity of the issue and 
the diverse range of actors involved’ meant ‘centralised European supervision is not the 
answer.’ ‘National governments are best placed’, it continued, ‘to organize the prevention and 
response to cyber incidents and attacks.’ That said, ‘due to the potential or actual borderless 
nature of the risks, an effective national response would often require EU-level involvement.’ 
The CSSEU thus went on to provide a clear rationale for an EU role involving a range of bodies 
(ENISA, Europol, the Commission, the High Representative and others) along with the Member 
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States in  ‘coordinat[ing] international action in the field of cybersecurity.’ Interestingly, the 
CSSEU was the first document to elaborate the need for an EU ‘cyberdefence capability’ to sit 
alongside efforts relating to cybercrime and network and information security (European 
Commission and High Representative 2013).  In this sense, it reflected the priorities of those 
actors within the EU institutional milieu that have been responsible for the development of the 
different strands of cyber security policy (the influence of the European Defence Agency and 
the European External Action Service being responsible for the cyber defence component).  
It is NIS and cybercrime that will be the main focus of this section given (as noted above) 
the still formative nature of cyber defence.  This is not to argue that horizontal interaction 
between Member States in cyber defence has been inconsequential, but rather that, the 
emergence of new practices here (training, education, exercises to test defence capability) are 
not yet routine or symmetric given there is no obligation (as is the case with Directives, 
Regulations etc.) to participate, transpose and implement at the national level. This contrasts 
with NIS and cybercrime. As already noted, each is governed by a mandate which impacts on 
our understanding of collective securitization and security governance, particularly if we accept 
the assumption of this Special Issue’s framing article that supranational policy is the outcome of 
recursive interaction and audience acceptance following a securitizing move by a supranational 
actor(s).  
The NIS Directive is illustrative of both a securitization move and the audience’s 
(Member States) acceptance of it. This strand of the CSSEU is underpinned by an Internal 
Market mandate and subject to the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP). The proposal for the 
NIS Directive put forth by the Commission was underpinned by a narrative of ‘managing 
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security risks’ in the context of a ‘fast-changing landscape of threats’ based on a view that 
existing capabilities and mechanisms did not ‘ensure a common high level of protection in  all 
the Member States’ (European Commission 2013: 1-2). The NIS Directive was adopted after 
lengthy discussion by the Council in August 2016 (Council of the European Union 2017) (it was 
accepted by the audience of Member States, in other words).  Its aim has been to: advance 
institutional preparedness among the Member States for cyber events by developing a 
functioning national/governmental CERT; establish prevention, detection, mitigation and 
response mechanisms for information sharing and mutual assistance amongst national NIS 
competent authorities; promote cross-border EU-wide cooperation through an EU NIS Action 
Plan; and improve the engagement and preparedness of the private sector through the 
reporting of major NIS incidents to national NIS competent authorities. 
In security governance terms, the regulatory logic of the Directive has been to move to 
mandatory reporting of cyber incidents and attacks given that voluntary, informal measures 
have proven insufficient to fully engage the private sector. How such security governance 
practices will become routinized within the EU and how the new strategic vocabulary of cyber 
security will develop is complicated by the fact that not all actors  - particularly in the private 
sector – accept mandatory reporting for the creation of an effective culture of cybersecurity. 
That said, at the time s of this writing it is too early to judge the effectiveness of the Directive 
(the deadline for its implementation being as recent as May 2018). 
Turning to cybercrime, the CSSEU views a dramatic reduction of this problem as a 
strategic priority and EC3 is singled out as ‘the European focal point’ in that effort.  EC3 was not 
created against the backdrop of a single precipitating event but rather in response to an 
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accumulation of problems. Its aim has been ‘to protect Europeans and businesses against 
mounting cyber-threats’ (European Commission 2012b). In the words of Cecilia Malmström, 
European Commissioner for Home Affairs, ‘[w]e can't let cybercriminals disrupt our digital lives. 
A European Cybercrime Centre within Europol will become a hub for cooperation in defending 
an internet that is free, open and safe’ (cited in European Commission 2012c).   EC3 reflects a 
desire shared by the Member States, the Council, the Commission and Europol (which is the 
institutional host) to tackle the increasing threat of cybercriminal activities. These, according to 
the Europol Serious and Organised Crime Assessment (SOCTA 2013, 2016; see also iOCTA 2016), 
have included online and payment card fraud, cybercrimes which cause serious harm to their 
victims (as in online child sexual exploitation), and cyber attacks on information systems and 
critical infrastructure. EC3 has been tasked with aligning its activities to those of other relevant 
EU agencies - Eurojust, ENISA, and the European Police College (CEPOL). This is to ensure that 
the priority areas identified under the EMPACT policy cycle - training, capacity-building, 
outreach, strategic analysis and technical support - are effectively addressed (see Europol 
2014). The EMPACT policy cycle was created by the Council of the EU in 2010 to ‘tackle the 
most important criminal threats in a coherent and methodological manner through optimum 
cooperation between the relevant services of the Member States, EU Institutions and EU 
Agencies, as well as relevant third countries and organizations’ (European Commission 2014: 9). 
One tangible aspect of EC3 has been the work of its Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce 
(J-CAT) established in September 2014 and made up of cyber liaison officers from certain 
Member States (UK, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, and Austria) and law 
enforcement partners from outside the EU (Norway, Switzerland, the US, Australia, Canada, 
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and Columbia). J-CAT has been credited with taking down the RAMNIT botnet (Europol 2015) 
that had infected 3.2 million computers globally; an operation that brought together and 
utilized the resources of public and private actors such as Microsoft, CERT-EU, Symantec and 
AnubisNetworks. J-CAT has received praise for coordinating actions against key cybercrime 
threats and in recognition of its work, a two-year review led in October 2017 to an indefinite 
extension of its operational mandate.  
J-CAT is subject to a very specific legal framework that allows it to be flexible, providing 
quick responses through the circumvention of common bureaucratic and legal obstacles. Such 
practices are not exceptional – but neither are they ‘normalized’ within the EU system – raising 
for some commentators, questions relating to transparency and accountability (Christou 2018). 
That said, in security governance terms, both the EC3 and J-CAT embedded within it have 
provided a new way of doing things – involving public and private actors, both national and 
international – that allows for more effective and timely action to be taken against 
cybercriminals and their networks.  In the language of the collective securitization model, what 
can be identified here is a process whereby cybercrime threat trends have led to speech acts by 
authoritative EU institutional actors and new measures to tackle them. EC3 and J-CAT are thus 
good examples of how a collective securitizzation move has resulted in a successful 
securitization and new security governance practices. 
 
Conclusion 
The CSSEU – reviewed and updated in September 2017 by the European Commission – 
signalled a securitization move which was the culmination not of a one-off event, but rather 
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cumulative threats to European networks and information systems. Annual cyber threat 
landscape reports from ENISA indicate how such threat narratives have been sustained in order 
to ensure such issues do not fall down the EU’s agenda. The same goes for European Council 
Conclusions, and the Commission’s reviews of the EU’s cybersecurity initiatives and relevant 
cybercrime and cybersecurity agencies. More broadly, we can see how a changing security 
environment has given rise to a perception that networks and information systems are 
increasingly vulnerable. This has promoted the development of security governance platforms, 
instruments and agencies to address perceived threats to the digital ambitions of the EU. EU 
policy towards cyber-related crime and networks and information system protection, whilst 
framed broadly within a security threat narrative, have also emanated from legal and economic 
logics, (which are still very much present).    
A central task of this article has been to demonstrate the visibility of collective 
securitization within the EU cybersecurity policy space.  The focus has been on the NIS and 
cybercrime specifically given the EU’s shared competence in these areas. Consistent with 
collective securitization we have seen securitizing moves by authoritative EU institutional actors 
as a result of a series of events and trends, in this case followed by Member State agreement to 
new legal frameworks, mechanisms and instruments. Further to this, it can be argued that in 
the areas of cybersecurity there is evidence of actorness – in the sense that the EU has been 
able to speak and practice security with competence and authority – and, indeed, shape its 
identity as a cybersecurity actor.  EU actorness remains anchored to an aggregating function in 
that the Member States retain important national prerogatives in the cyber space, but 
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aggregation has meant a significant movement toward EU autonomy thus indicating the 
tentative development of the thick version of collective securitisation.  
The collective securitization of cyberspace has clearly enabled the EU to carry out the 
functions of security governance in terms of patterned, stakeholder and regulatory interaction, 
even if in terms of policy outputs and national transposition, it is not possible to judge at the 
time of writing, how far new practices have evolved and been implemented/routinized.  In 
cybercrime, the broader EU legal frameworks that have been agreed (for instance, Directives on 
combating the sexual exploitation of children online, child pornography, and attacks against 
information systems) have led to the implementation of collaborative practices at national 
levels between relevant stakeholders, and also transnationally – albeit asymmetrically and with 
problems remaining relating to consistency, legal clarity and capacity.  We can also observe 
how perceptions of threat, from cybercriminals or in relation to cyber attacks, can result in 
novel and new governance initiatives (such as the EC3 and J-CAT) alongside the renewal of 
agencies such as ENISA that deal with the security of networks and information systems in 
Europe. Indeed, the review of ENISA is indicative of the circular nature of the collective 
(re)securitization process. Its continuing utility is seen in a context of increasing threat trends 
(often perpetuated and maintained by the agency as well as other authoritative EU institutional 
actors) giving rise to a call for an enhancement of its mandate in the EU cybersecurity 
ecosystem.  The implication in all of this is that going forward we need further consideration of 
differentiated and perhaps also fragmented security governance practices.     
Finally, it is worth offering some reflections on the concept of collective securitization 
and its relationship to security governance in the context of EU cybersecurity. First, the 
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complexity of cybersecurity has meant that the actor/audience relationship has often been 
blurred – and co-dependent and securitization moves have been asymmetric across the pillars 
of cybercrime and NIS.  The upshot is that we have not seen an equal evolution of new (and 
existing) proposed practices. Equally, variation has been evident in the forms of stakeholder 
interaction that have and are being constituted as a result of collective securitization. 
Second, whilst the framework provided by the editors emphasises recursive interaction 
‘between a security actor (the organisation) and its audience (the organisation’s constituent 
members)’ (*** and *** this issue) - there is also a need to consider the ‘audience’ beyond this, 
in relation to the implementation and routinization of any new policies that result. This 
expanded understanding of the relevant audience is especially important where the referents 
under threat are multiple and where the private sector is essential to both legitimising 
securitizing moves and the success of any implementation. Moreover, and beyond issues of 
audience, the role of the private sector in the formulation of regulation, in particular in the field 
of critical information infrastructure protection (see Carrapico and Farrand 2017), has to be 
further considered within the collective securitization process.   
Finally, we might also ask how contestation following a securitizing move can lead to 
desecuritizing dynamics (as has been the case with data retention). The collective securitization 
framework suggests a unidirectional model in which, following a securitizing move and 
endorsement by the audience, policy implementation occurs. The cybersecurity case has 
shown, however, that following a precipitating event, agreed legal instruments in the name of 
collective securitization can be desecuritized by supranational actors such as the ECJ. This has 
implications, in turn, for the development of security governance. More broadly, we must also 
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probe further the ethical and normative implications of any securitizing move and practice - for 
example, how collective securitization sits with collective rights in relation to privacy and data 
protection. Debates on cybersecurity have shown a real tension here and can (and arguably, 
should) shape the how practices for enhancing security in cyberspace are developed over time.        
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Endnotes 
1 For a conceptual exploration and critical discussion of the role of Public-Private Partnerships in EU 
cybersecurity see Bossong and Wagner (2017).  See also Dunn Cavelty and Suter (2009) on PPPs and Critical 
Infrastructure Protection. 
2 A mandatory requirement to report network and information security breaches was included in the revised 
EU Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework in 2009 (European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union 2009). This requirement (Art.13a, Directive/140 EC) was restricted to the 
telecommunications sector, however, whereas the NIS Directive broadened the scope to a wide array of 
actors involved in network and information security.   
3 The EU’s discourse and policy on cybercrime has also borrowed from existing national, international and 
regional frameworks such as the Council of Europe Conference on Criminological Aspects of Economic Crime 
(1976), the US Crime Control Act (1984) and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (198 6). See Deflem and 
Shutt (2006) for a detailed account of the evolution of computer crime legislation. 
4 An interesting perspective on the role of private actors as important regulators in themselves (as opposed to just 
co-enforcers) in the area of EU critical information infrastructure is provided by Carrapico and Farrand (2017). 
                                                          
